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Need for Congressional Limits
On Availability of Private
Civil Remedies Under the
Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)1/

I.

OVERVIEW
In 1970, the Congress enacted comprehensive legislation

aimed at stemming the infiltration of legitimate business by
organized crime.

Included in the bill late in its consideration

and with little discussion was a private civil remedy which

allowed any victim of "racketeering" to sue in federal court and
recover three times his damages, plus attorney’s fees.

Today,

with increasing and alarming frequency, this seemingly

meritorious device for redressing the wrongs of organized crime
has been turned against ordinary businessmen — the very people

the Act intended to protect.

Among those who have found

themselves targeted by racketeering allegations have been
accountants, banks, insurance companies, securities firms, real

estate developers, those engaged in basic manufacturing, and many
others.
Until recently, a few courts had issued decisions narrowing

the scope of the statute to conform it to legislative intent.
The Supreme Court has now held that the courts do not have the

1/
18 U.S.C. §§ 1963-1968, enacted as Title IX of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970.

-2authority to stop the misuse of civil RICO, and that only

Congress may do so.

In its recent decision in Sedima, S.P.R.L.

v. Imrex Co., 105 S.Ct. 3275, 53 U.S.L.W. 5034 (July 1, 1985)

("Sedima"), the Court unanimously recognized that RICO is being

used in ways unintended by Congress, as a weapon against
legitimate businessmen in ordinary commercial disputes.

A bare

majority of the Court, however, held that this unfortunate result
"is inherent in the statute as written, and its correction must

lie with Congress."

Thus, the misuse repeatedly noted by

commentators and courts alike, including now the United States
Supreme Court, can only be eliminated by Congressional action.

II.

THE NATURE OF THE RICO CLAIM
The key to RICO is the extensive list of "predicate"

offenses that are defined as constituting "racketeering activity"

in 18 U.S.C. § 1961.

The commission of any two of these

predicate acts within a ten year period constitutes the requisite

pattern of racketeering activity, triggering the availability of
the treble damage claim.

18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).

Included in the list of racketeering activity are crimes

such as murder, kidnapping, extortion and arson, the crimes that

are normally associated with organized crime.

Had the Congress

confined its list of predicate offenses to those matters there
probably would not today be any complaint with the Act.

However,

Congress chose also to include in the litany of proscribed
racketeering activity, mail and wire fraud and fraud in the sale
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of securities.

By so doing, it has inadvertently enabled

inventive private litigants to convert virtually every allegation

of fraud under the securities laws to an allegation of

racketeering activity.

This new power allows the claimant to

circumvent the carefully considered legal rules and standards

developed over the last fifty years under the securities laws.
It also creates potential awards that are three times what would

otherwise be available under the federal securities laws, plus a

recovery of legal fees.

Moreover, in including the wire fraud

and mail fraud statutes, which had never before provided the
basis for a private action, Congress unintentionally created a

private, federal civil treble-damage claim for "fraud" based on a

mere showing that two or more mailings or telephone calls were
made in carrying out an alleged "fraud."

As Justice Marshall,

writing for four dissenting Justices of the Supreme Court in the
Sedima case, recognized, "the effects of making a mere two
instances of mail or wire fraud potentially actionable under

civil RICO are staggering."
The mere allegation of racketeering activity under the

statute is also damaging in itself.

Few professionals or

businesses dependent on maintaining a reputation for integrity
dare risk the harm that may result from this type of publicity,
even if confident that the litigation will prove unsuccessful.

Being innocent is not enough!

The ability to label a defendant

"a racketeer" by the initiation of litigation, coupled with the
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legal costs of defending against such a case and the potential of
treble damages, are powerful pressures to induce a settlement.
Again, quoting Justice Marshall in Sedima:

"The defendant,

facing a tremendous financial exposure in addition to the threats

of being labelled a racketeer, will have a strong interest in
settling this dispute."

III.

THE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE
The bill from which the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970

(including the RICO title) was derived originated in the Senate
and contained no private civil provision when introduced or when

initially passed by the Senate.

The object of the legislation

was clearly stated in the Senate report:
"The eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening of legal
tools in the evidence gathering process, by
establishing new penal prohibitions, and by
providing enhanced sanctions and new
remedies to deal with the unlawful
activities of those engaged in organized
crime."

S. Rep. No. 90-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. at 2
(1969).
In this vein, Senator McClellan, the chief sponsor, focused his

arguments for the bill on the insidious activities of "La Cosa
Nostra" and its impact on legitimate business.

He recognized

that when "organized crime moves into a business, it usually
brings to that venture all the techniques of violence and
intimidation which is used in its illegal business," and RICO

was designed to attack that infiltration.
(1969).

115 Cong. Rec. 5872
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The House, too, was mainly concerned with the infiltration
of organized crime figures into businesses across the nation.

Thus, Congressman Poff, a leading proponent of the legislation,
pointed to the takeover of a jukebox business by "a mafia boss"

as an illustration of the general understanding that PICO was
meant to prevent organized crime from injuring legitimate
business people.

116 Cong. Rec. 6709 (1970).

The private civil remedy, with its provision for treble

damages and attorney’s fees, was added to the legislation in
the House Judiciary Committee.

See S. 30 and Related Proposals

Relating to the Control of Organized Crime in the United
States.

Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the Committee on

the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 520-22, 543-44 (1970).

In the sparse debate on the civil damage provision, the
Chairman of the House

Judiciary Committee, Representative

Celler, explained that the addition of a treble damage remedy
was to be one of the tools "designed to inhibit the

infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime."

116

Cong. Rec. 35,196 (1970).
The Senate accepted the House version of the bill,
including the new provision for private civil suits, without

any suggestion that the focus of congressional concern had been

shifted in the slightest.

Indeed, Senator McClellan described

the House amendments, including the addition of the civil
provision, as relatively "minor changes."

116 Cong. Rec.
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36,292-96, at 36,293 (1970).

At no time did anyone ever

suggest that the private civil remedy was intended for use
against legitimate business people, corporations, and licensed
professional partnerships, or was to be used in commercial

disputes having nothing whatsoever to do with the activities of
what was and is commonly understood to be "organized crime."
IV.

THE ACTUAL USES OF THE PRIVATE CIVIL DAMAGE PROVISION

In light of this explicit congressional intent, civil RICO
actions should have closely paralleled criminal prosecutions
and attacked similar kinds of conduct.

Instead, while the

Justice Department has carefully limited its use of RICO to

attack true organized crime, virtually none of the uses of the

private civil remedy have involved organized crime figures or
the kinds of offenses committed by organized crime figures.
Rather, civil RICO is used almost exclusively in commercial

disputes, virtually all of which are either covered by specific
federal regulatory laws such as the securities laws or do not

belong in the federal courts at all.
The statute is now being invoked in every kind of

litigation where the predicate offense of "fraud" can possibly

be alleged.

RICO counts have been added to litigation brought

to challenge takeover bids and RICO is being used to challenge
the way banks set their interest rates.

RICO counts have

appeared in many other commercial transactions, including
churning of stock, representations about a broker’s expertise,
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projections used in real estate syndication, disputes between
landlord and tenant, disallowance of insurance claims, alleged

overcharges by a printer, and failure to publish a medical
journal according to a contractual agreement.

Even more

ludicrous, RICO allegations have also been added to religious

disputes and matrimonial controversies.
The American Bar Association’s special RICO Task Force

recently collected comprehensive data about hundreds of private

civil RICO cases, almost all of which have been reported since

1982.2/

The Report classified the essential allegations

underlying the RICO charges as follows:

Percentage

Underlying Allegation

40

securities fraud

37

common law fraud in a
commercial setting

4

antitrust or unfair competition

4

bribery or commercial bribery

3

other fraud

2

labor disputes

1

theft or conversion

9

offenses such as arson associated with
professional criminal activity

2/
ABA RICO Task Force Report at 53, 55 (of the cases collected
in the Report’s database, 3% were decided prior to 1980, 2% were
decided in 1980, 7% in 1981, 13% in 1982, 33% in 1983 and 43% in
1984 ).
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Another private survey located 132 civil RICO cases in
which opinions have been published.

According to the

descriptions of allegations contained in those cases, they fall
into the following categories:

Securities transactions

57

Commercial and contract disputes

38

Commodities trading

6

Bank loans

6

Antitrust price fixing

3

Religious disputes

2

Divorce

1

Union affairs

3

Commercial bribery/kickbacks

2

Political corruption (including
official extortion and bribery)

9

Theft (by cleaners from apartment
dwellers)

1

Violent crimes (murder, arson, extortion)

3

Thus, cases that could fairly be characterized as having
anything to do with aiding the war on organized crime are a
3/
tiny minority.3/

3/
Both the majority and minority opinions in the Sedima case
accepted and cited these statistics. Both recognized that this
result was not what Congress intended; they diverged only on the
question whether the courts may properly do anything to prevent
future use of the statute in this manner. The majority concluded
that this is a task for Congress, not the courts.
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In his testimony last spring before the Senate Judiciary

Committee on the need for civil RICO reform, Assistant Attorney
General Trott of the Department of Justice reported that the
Department’s own survey of private RICO cases confirmed this

pattern of massive abuse.

He estimated that, as a result of

the increasing use of civil RICO in commercial disputes, the

actual number of private cases filed already exceeds 500.

According to the Justice Department’s calculations, only about

7% of these cases involve either actual organized crime figures
or the kinds of criminal conduct common to organized crime

syndicates.

As Assistant Attorney General Trott concluded:

"Experience has shown . . . that the
instances of private civil RICO's use
against traditional organized crime
activities are far outweighed by example of
its application as a general federal
anti-fraud remedy against seemingly
reputable businessmen."

V.

THE BURGEONING EXPANSION OF CIVIL RICO CLAIMS

As these statistics show, the situation is already out of
hand and likely to get worse.

Relatively few private RICO cases have progressed all the
way to judgment, because intensive use of the statute in civil

cases only began to blossom a few years ago.

The ABA RICO Task

Force Report found that, although the statute was enacted in
1970, there was only one reported opinion in a civil RICO case

as of 1972, only one other case reported prior to 1975, and
only nine reported decisions prior to 1980.

ABA RICO Task
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Force Report at 55.

exponentially.

Since then, the numbers have grown

The invocation of RICO against legitimate

businesses in kinds of disputes never contemplated by Congress

when it passed RICO is almost certain to accelerate in the wake

of the recent Supreme Court decisions, since the Court has
eliminated almost any chance that previously existed that a

defendant could defeat a RICO claim at the threshold of
litigation.

In addition, there is rapidly spreading publicity about
the utility of RICO as a device for getting a local commercial

dispute into federal court or as a tactic for dramatically
increasing the stakes in a case otherwise covered by the

traditional single-damage feature of other federal laws, such
as the securities laws.

Legal and business journals are filled

with articles discussing the statute.

Numerous professional

development courses are being given nationwide to acquaint

lawyers with RICO’s possibilities.

For example, the ABA has

held at least four "continuing legal education" national
institutes on RICO.

Others are planned.

With ominous accuracy

the ABA titled some of its sessions "RICO: The Ultimate Weapon

in Business and Commercial Litigation."

The volume of RICO

cases is so heavy that several special reporting services,

dedicated solely to RICO matters, are now published.
When the Los Angeles Times published a series of articles

on "the litigation explosion," it devoted a front page article

-11-

just to private civil RICO suits, entitling the feature,
"’RICO’ Running Amok in the Board Rooms," and subtitling the

piece, "Law aimed at Mafia becomes popular in private suits."
Siegel, Los Angeles Times, February 15, 1984.

As the article

accurately reports, the "most general response by trial judges

to these suits has been dismay."

VI.

THE SUPREME COURT’S DETERMINATION THAT
REFORM MUST COME FROM CONGRESS
Several trial courts tried to give some sensible limit to

the scope of RICO.

Most of these attempts, however

meritorious, were turned aside by appellate courts taking the
position that it is beyond their province to limit an

excessively broad statute that literally covers far more than
Congress contemplated.

See e.g. Schact v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343

(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 508 (1983); Bennett v.
Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (Sth Cir. 1982), modified en banc, 701 F.2d

1361 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 527 (1983); Morosani v.

First National Bank of Atlanta, 703 F.2d 1220 (11th Cir. 1983).

Finally, this past term, the Supreme Court dashed whatever
faint hope had existed that judicial construction of the
statute could tame runaway civil RICO.

In a 5-4 vote, the

Court overturned a decision of the Second Circuit in which the
court of appeals had held that a civil RICO claim could only be
brought against a defendant who had been convicted of the

predicate acts underlying the RICO claim or of RICO itself and

could only be brought to collect damages for a separate

-12"racketeering injury," wholly distinct from injury arising from
the predicate acts themselves.

Sedima, supra.

At the same

time, the Court affirmed a Seventh Circuit decision in which

the lower court had ruled that the statute does not require a
plaintiff to allege and prove a separate "racketeering" injury.
American National Bank v. Haroco, Inc., 105 S.Ct. 3291, 53

U.S.L.W. 5067 (July 1, 1985)

(per curiam).

In deciding these

cases, the Court made it clear that any correction in the
course civil RICO has taken must come from Congress, not the

courts.

The Court was unanimous in recognizing that civil RICO had
strayed far from the object that Congress had in mind when it
wrote and passed the Act.

The majority opinion in Sedima

acknowledged that it understood the "concern over the
consequences of an unbridled reading of the statute," and the

Second Circuit's perception of "misuse of civil RICO."

The

majority opinion also recognized that, "in its private civil
version, RICO is evolving into something quite different from

the original conception of its enactors," and that "private

civil actions under the statute are being brought almost solely
against" what the Court called "respected and legitimate

enterprises," rather than against "the archetypal, intimidating
mobster."

And the majority cited, with approval, the

statistics from the ABA Task Force Report, see p. 8, supra,

that bear out that conclusion.
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Justice Marshall, writing in dissent for four members of
the Court, was even more explicit in detailing the ways in
which civil RICO claims have caused disruptions far beyond

anything intended by Congress, and the majority did not
disagree with the dissenters’ descriptions.

Justice Marshall

detailed the ways that "in both theory and practice, civil RICO
has brought profound changes to our legal landscape," and he

recognized that "nothing in the language of the statute or the

legislative history suggests that Congress intended either the
federalization of state common law or the displacement of
existing federal remedy."

Justice Marshall’s opinion

summarized the troublesome results of civil RICO:
"These cases take their toll; their results
distort the market by saddling legitimate
businesses with uncalled-for punitive bills
and undeserved labels. To allow punitive
actions and significant damages for injury
beyond that which the statute was intended
to target is to achieve nothing the statute
sought to achieve, and ironically to injure
many of those lawful businesses that the
statute sought to protect."

Justice Powell, who joined in Justice Marshall’s opinion,

also wrote separately, reiterating the manner in which civil
RICO has come to be used "against legitimate businesses seeking
treble damages in ordinary fraud and contract cases," and

concluding that "it defies rational belief, particularly in
light of the legislative history, that Congress intended this
far-reaching result."

-14-

The majority and minority parted company only over the
question of whether the courts could play any role in narrowing

civil RICO’s reach.

The minority believed that the language of

the statute could plausibly be interpreted narrowly in certain
respects.

The majority, applying its philosophical belief that

the courts should not rewrite statutes, accepted the premise

that the statute is being used in unintended ways but rejected
the notion that the Court could play any role in solving that

dilemma.

The majority placed responsibility for solving the

problem upon the representative body that passed the statute in
the first place:

”[T]his defect — if defect it is — is

inherent in the statute as written, and its correction must lie
with Congress." (emphasis added)
VII. REFORMING CIVIL ’RICO’

A.

The Need for Reform
The explosion of unjustified civil RICO cases is

already at hand, and the Supreme Court's decision in Sedima is
bound to accelerate it.

The adverse effects of this

development on the courts and on legitimate business are

direct, palpable, and unwarranted.

It would be difficult to

overstate the in terrorem effect of civil RICO on legitimate

businesses, even though relatively few companies, to date,
actually have been ordered to pay treble damages in these
cases.

As Business Week reported:

-15"Law
yers say the number of court awards
under RICO is not an accurate measure of
the problem, because few cases go to trial:
the mere threat of a headline suggesting a
connection with organized crime often
induces a settlement." February 20, 1984
at 85.

In addition, the scope of the permissible allegations permits

wide-ranging pretrial discovery: "That gets very, very
expensive," one securities lawyer was quoted as explaining,

"and the cost tends to result in settlements."

Id.

In urging reform, the ABA has recognized:

"When RICO is combined with mail fraud
predicate offenses, the effect is to
federalize all torts involving business
transactions in which a party thinks
deceitfully and uses the mails. This
result is undesirable in two respects:
(1) the efficient operation of federal
courts will be significantly impaired, if
not crippled, by a tidal wave of RICO civil
actions when plaintiffs become aware of the
attractions of treble damages and recovery
of attorney’s fees; and
(2) the balance between state and
federal power will be substantially
disrupted.
If future RICO statutes are to
include civil remedies, use of mail fraud
as a predicate offense must be limited."
Report to the House of Delegates by the
Section of Criminal Justice, the American
Bar Association, August 1982 at 8, adopted
by the House of Delegates August 1982.

According to the recent ABA RICO Task Force survey, fully 74%

of all lawyers with actual experience with RICO claims, whether
as counsel for plaintiffs or defendants, believe that the
statute should be amended, and only 8% see no need for reform.

-16Judges, acting in their capacity as commentators on what

they are witnessing, have also spoken out in public about the
problem.

Thus, District Judge Milton Pollack of New York

recently said:

"one of the proliferating developments in
civil litigation has been the use of RICO,
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act, in civil claims, in
routine commercial disputes, including
those arising under the Federal Securities
Laws.
I think that the proliferation of
those claims and the use of a law that was
designed to eliminate organized crime is a
very bad influence on the commercial
community." "Symposium Highlighting
Developments in Securities Law Over Past
Century," New York Law Journal, January 30,
1984 at 52.
And Judge Abner Mikva of the United States Court of Appeals in

Washington, who warned against the overbreadth of the proposed

RICO bill when he was in Congress in 1970, has seen RICO
outstrip his worst fears.

He warned then that placing a treble

damage remedy under so broadly worded a statute would provide
an "invitation" to the "disgruntled and malicious" to "harass

innocent businessmen ..."

H. Rep. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong.

2nd. Sess., reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4007, 4083.

As he accurately predicted, "what a protracted, expensive trial

may not succeed in doing, the adverse publicity may well
accomplish — destruction of the rival’s business."

In a

recent interview with a reporter from the Los Angeles Times,

Judge Mikva expressed regret that these problems were not
avoided by deletion of the civil provision.
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In their formal opinions as well, many courts have warned

about these dangers, even while deciding that they are obliged

to apply the expansive language of the statute as originally
written.

For example, the Seventh Circuit in Schact observed,

while allowing a mail fraud allegation to proceed as a RICO

case, that Congress inadvertently "may well have created a
runaway treble damage bonanza for the already excessively
litigious."

Schact v. Brown, supra, 711 F.2d at 1361.

In another Seventh Circuit case, the court commented that

RICO "is constructed on the model of a treasure hunt," but
added nevertheless:
"we must abide by Congress’s decision, made
at a time of less sensitivity than today to
the workload pressures on the federal
courts and to the desirability of
maintaining a reasonable balance between
state and federal courts, however much we
may regret not only the burdens that the
decision has cast on the federal courts but
also the displacement of state tort law
into the federal courts that it has brought
about." Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan
Companies, Inc., 727 F.2d 648, 652 (7th
Cir. 1984).

The Administration has heard these calls for reform and

has decided that they are well founded.

The Vice President’s

Task Group on Regulation of Financial Services, whose members
included the Attorney General, recognized in its final report
adopted on July 2, 1984, that civil RICO is being abused.

Task Group found that:

The
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" [A] statute designed to control organized
crime through both criminal and civil
penalties against racketeering . . . has
increasingly been utilized by imaginative
lawyers in suits against banks, securities
firms, accountants and other perfectly
legitimate businesses without even any
alleged connection to organized crime."
The Report continued:

"This litigation increases the backlog in
federal courts, undermines the structure of
the substantive banking and securities laws
enacted by Congress, and creates totally
unnecessary costs for the affected firms
and, ultimately, their customers."
B.

Responsibility of the Congress to
Limit the RICO Remedy

The Supreme Court, in Sedima, mirrored the consensus
in the courts that it is up to Congress, not the courts, to

remedy the undesirable effects of the way RICO was originally
drafted.

"The legislature having spoken, it is not
our role to reassess the costs and benefits
associated with the creation of a
dramatically expansive, and perhaps
insufficiently discriminate tool for
combating organized crime." Schact v.
Brown, supra, 711 F.2d at 1361.

"[W]e are cautioned by the Supreme Court
that broad Congressional action should not
be restricted by the courts in the name of
federalism ... It is beyond our authority
to restrict the reach of the statute [civil
RICO]." Bennett v. Berg, supra, 685 F.2d
at 1064 (panel opinion).
"Complaints that RICO may effectively
federalize common law fraud and erode
recent restrictions on claims for
securities fraud are better addressed to
Congress than to courts." Moss v. Morgan
Stanley, supra, 719 F.2d at 21, quoting

-19Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and
Impropriety of Judicial Restriction, 95
Harv. L. Rev. 1101, 1121 (1982).
"We can only hope that this decision
appears to Congress as the distress flag
that it is, and that Congress will act to
limit, as only it is empowered to, the
statute’s application . . . ." Illinois
Dept. of Revenue v. Phillips, No. 84-1495
(7th Cir. Aug. 27, 1985).
In the words of former District Court Judge Simon
Rifkind:

"I have a feeling about RICO in the civil
world, not in the criminal side, as being
the most conspicuous case I know of
legislation requiring Congressional
attention for revision." "Symposium
Highlighting Developments in Securities Law
Over Past Century", New York Law Journal,
January 30, 1984 at 52.
Former Judge Rifkind’s observations draw attention to an

important distinction between the criminal enforcement of RICO

and the use made by private litigants of the private treble
damage remedy.

In recognition of the great potential for abuse

of RICO, the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal
Division at the Department of Justice issued detailed "RICO

Guidelines" designed to assure that the criminal sanctions

would be used as Congress intended — as a tool for combating

organized crime.

The Guidelines specifically cautioned against

"’imaginative’ prosecutions under RICO which are far afield
4/
from the Congressional purpose of the RICO statute."4/

Preface to RICO Guidelines, published in 9 United States
Attorneys’ Manual, Ch 110 (1981).

-20Unfortunately, there is not today a means for similarly

constraining the imagination of private litigants and their
counsel.

Indeed, some legal commentators have begun to suggest

that restraints on the part of the bar may be even less likely
in the future, for attorneys may even be under a professional

obligation to include a RICO count in their pleadings in any
case which contains an allegation of commercial fraud.

As a

recent New York Law Journal article counseled:

"a plaintiff’s attorney jealously
protecting the rights of his client, as he
is charged to do, is obligated to bring
RICO claims where they can reasonably be
interposed." Broadsky, "RICO", New York
Law Journal, February 15, 1984, at p. 1,
Col. 1.

C.

Legislative Reform
There is one straight-forward amendment to civil RICO

that would eliminate the existing abuses, refocus the statute

on its intended targets, and adapt the Justice Department’s

Guidelines to the civil use of RICO.

That would be to permit

civil claims to proceed under RICO only after the defendant has
been convicted of a RICO offense or of one of the predicate

offenses.

This amendment would effectively curb the abuse of

the discretionary power to bring private claims against

legitimate business people involved in ordinary commercial
activities.

It would confine the circumstances in which suits

can be filed to those in which public prosecutors have screened

those people who may fairly be charged with being involved in
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crimes from those who should not be subject to accusations of
"racketeering".
What is needed is legislation that will amend 18 U.S.C.
S 1964(c) so that a private civil plaintiff could only bring

suit against a defendant who has been convicted of either one
of the predicate acts or of a RICO violation itself.

In either

case, the conviction would have to be for the conduct upon

which the private suit is based.

Under this amendment, civil RICO could no longer be used
simply to raise the stakes in or federalize commercial

disputes.

The plaintiff would have to prove that:

(1)

the defendant violated the provisions
of RICO by engaging in conduct that
violated 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962;

(2)

the defendant has been convicted
either of a RICO violation or of one
of the predicate acts based on the
conduct upon which the plaintiff bases
his civil RICO claim;

(3)

the plaintiff has been injured in his
business or property by the
defendant’s violation of Section 1962;
and

(4)

the plaintiff has filed his treble
damage suit within one year of the
latest pertinent convictions.

With this change in the law, civil RICO could only be used
against persons whom prosecutors have decided to charge with

crimes and who have been found guilty of criminal acts.

This

amendment would restore the central role of public prosecutors

originally envisioned by Congress.

Before plaintiffs could

-22call upon the treble damage remedy made available under RICO

specifically to deal with organized crime, there would first

have to be a determination by the public prosecutors and juries

that the defendant was actually engaged in criminal activity.
If there has been no criminal conviction, the claimant would
simply have to resort to the array of other federal and state
remedies that are quite adequate to deal with disputes that do
not truly involve organized crime or racketeering.

VIII. CONCLUSION

The need for reform is clear.

clear.

The nature of the reform is

And the responsibility for reform is clear.

Congress

should move promptly to amend the civil provisions of RICO to
restore the private remedy to its original purpose as an

additional weapon against organized crime, while curing its
capacity to inflict harm and unreasonable costs on innocent
business people.

The easiest and best method to accomplish

this purpose is to create a prior-criminal conviction
requirement in private civil RICO actions.

